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2ABSTRACT
Persistent high unemployment in Europe has led to renewed interest
in Active Labour Market Policy. However, most existing theory
suggests that its effects are ambiguous at best. We argue that job
search assistance and wage subsidies are more appropriately
modelled as a transition rather than the state-based approach of
existing theory. This eliminates the ambiguity. We present two main
models, one in which negative duration dependence in
unemployment arises from state dependence, the other where it is
due to heterogeneity. In both cases policy is unambiguously effective
provided it is targeted on those who are, or are most likely to
become, long-term unemployed. Some crude estimates suggest that
Active Labour Market Policies could have a significant, though not
spectacular, effect in reducing unemployment.
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8CAN ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY WORK?
SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
James Richardson
The persistence of high unemployment in much of western Europe
has led to renewed interest in Active Labour Market Policies
(ALMPs). Yet although there is a wealth of micro level studies (see
OECD, 1993 for a survey), there have been few attempts to model
ALMPs explicitly in a macroeconomic context. This is despite the
fact that success of the programmes at micro level is neither
sufficient nor necessary for ALMP to reduce aggregate
unemployment: successful programme effects may simply substitute
one group of unemployed for another, or be offset by increased wage
pressure (Calmfors and Forslund, 1991; Calmfors and Lang, 1995).
Conversely, even apparently useless schemes may be effective by
reducing wage pressure among workers keen to avoid ending up on
them (Jackman, 1994).
Compounding the difficulties in interpreting the micro-level
studies, most of the attempts at macroeconomic modelling have
concluded that the effect of policy is ambiguous (Holmlund and
Lindén, 1993; Aarnio, 1993; Jackman, 1994; Calmfors and Lang,
1995). Typically, increased competition for jobs among the
unemployed and improvements in the matching process are offset by
reduced welfare loss for the unemployed and possible reduced
search whilst on programmes, leaving the overall effect uncertain. At
a time when governments are being urged to allocate increased
resources to Active Labour Market Policy, the message is far from
clear.
However, we argue that the ambiguity in existing models arises
out of a view of Active Labour Market Policy that is not universally
applicable. An understandable tendency to model policy along
Swedish lines has led to an emphasis on scheme-based ALMP,
where policy is seen as the creation of an explicit state into which
unemployed workers are placed. Exit rates both during and after
9scheme-participation, together with in-scheme conditions, offer a
host of policy parameters and consequent scope for ambiguity.
By modelling policy as a transition, rather than a state, we are
able to obtain simple and unambiguous effects. Provided policy is
targeted on those who are, or who are most likely to become, long-
term unemployed, ALMP leads to a fall in equilibrium
unemployment. We believe that this approach is particularly suited
to modelling job search assistance and wage subsidies. We present
two main models, one in which negative duration dependence among
the unemployed is a consequence of state dependence, and one
where it is due to heterogeneity among the unemployed.
Section 1 below sets out the assumptions we make in
modelling policy as a transition rather than a state, and considers the
supporting evidence. Sections 2 and 3 consider the state dependence
case with efficiency wages and union bargaining respectively.
Section 4 sets out the basic heterogeneity model, whilst section 5
extends this to allow more explicit targeting on the long-term
unemployed. Section 6 presents some simple calculations, whilst 7
concludes.
1. ALMP AS A TRANSITION
Active labour market policies can be divided into five categories
(OECD, 1993): temporary job creation; training; job search
assistance; wage subsidies for regular employment; and assistance for
those starting their own enterprises. Of these only the first is
unambiguously a separate state within the labour force. Trainees are
arguably out of the labour force altogether, whilst the availability of
job search assistance, wage or self-employment subsidies do not
constitute a separate state into which the unemployed are placed,
but rather act to increase transition probabilities into regular (or self)
employment. Wage formation in self-employment is not adequately
captured within our model, but such programmes are inevitably on a
limited scale since self-employment is of interest to only a small
subgroup of the unemployed (OECD, 1993).  By capturing the
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effects of job search assistance and wage subsidies we consider that
our transitions approach is at least as relevant as the predominant
state-based models.
We model policy in the simplest possible way, as an increase in
the relative outflow rate of those on whom the policy is targeted. It is
easy to see within the models that this implies an increase in their
absolute outflow rate as well, but overall outflow rates are of course
endogenous, and therefore we do not assume this. Implicit in this is
the idea of a matching function with the potential for productivity
gains (Pissarides, 1990). However, we do not explicitly model
search. As Calmfors and Lang (1995) show, the introduction of
search does not affect the wage-setting schedule, but increased
search will shift out labour demand, further enhancing the
effectiveness of policy.
We take it for granted that well-designed programmes are
capable of increasing the outflow rates of those who participate in
them, at least relative to other unemployed workers. Furthermore,
we assume that not all of this effect is simply ‘queue jumping’ at the
expense of other members of the target group (although it may be at
the expense of other unemployed workers not in the target group),
so that the relative outflow rate for the target group as a whole rises.
Alternatively, we could assume that the programme covers the whole
of the target group so that the possibility of queue jumping within
the target group does not arise.
Job search assistance is straightforward to model in this way.
Such programmes do not carry the risk of reduced search for their
duration, which is anyway typically very short. Nor do they
generally involve enhanced benefit payments beyond some possible
token element to cover expenses. Hence their sole effect is through
increasing outflow rates of the target group. One of the few areas of
agreement among the micro studies is that job search assistance
programmes generally succeed in increasing outflow rates among
participants (OECD, 1993).
Modelling wage subsidies as a transition involves a greater
degree of simplification, but we do not believe it to be too far
11
removed from the empirical evidence. Moreover, we are taking a
deliberately pessimistic view of what wage subsidies can achieve.
The impact of wage subsidy programmes is generally
disaggregated into four effects:
i) Deadweight: where the vacancy would anyway have been filled
by someone eligible for the subsidy so that the hiring decision
is unaffected.
ii) Substitution: where the vacancy would otherwise have been
filled by another unemployed person from outside the target
group, eg where a subsidised long-term unemployed person is
hired in preference to an unsubsidised short-term unemployed
person.
iii) Displacement: where firms receiving the subsidy are able to win
orders at the expense of competitors, leading to a drop in
labour demand in rival firms.
iv) Job creation: Net expansion of labour demand.
We consider only the case where deadweight is less than
100%, so that the subsidy has at least some effect. Provided that the
programme has a reasonable degree of coverage and that the target
group have a low initial outflow rate, this condition is certain to be
met.
For simplicity, we will assume that displacement occurs
through natural wastage rather than redundancies, so that the job
separation rates are unaffected. Although difficult to measure,
displacement effects are generally found to be quite small (Atkinson
and Meager, 1994; Breen and Halpin, 1989), in part because
subsidies are relatively low and most firms take on only one or two
subsidised workers, so that this does not seem unreasonable. Hence
displacement also involves hiring a subsidised worker at the expense
of an unsubsidised one, where now the unsubsidised worker would
have been employed at a rival firm. Thus we can treat substitution
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and displacement as essentially the same and refer to them both
simply as substitution.
This leaves ‘job creation’. All the micro studies identify this as
the measure of success. Implicit in this view is the assumption that
the policy acts by increasing labour demand at given wages, a view
that can be traced back to Kaldor (1936) and Pigou (1933).
However, the studies suggest that increases in labour demand are
relatively modest, at most about one-quarter of the total. Even this
may be an over-estimate, since studies are typically based on surveys
of employers who may have an incentive to disguise substitution.
That the effect on labour demand should be limited is not surprising,
since subsidies are typically relatively small, around 50% of six
months wages, and temporary.
Instead, we shall assume that there is no effect on labour
demand, turning the conventional criterion of programme success on
its head. Net of deadweight, we shall treat wage subsidies as having a
pure substitution effect. It is easy to see that this is precisely
equivalent to an increase in the relative outflow rate of those eligible
for the subsidy, at given labour demand. Formally, therefore, we are
providing an analysis only of the substitution effects of wage
subsidies and not also of their labour demand effects. The neglect of
the macroeconomic implications of these substitution effects in most
past studies provides sufficient justification for this approach. The
evidence also seems to suggest that it is substitution, not job
creation, that is the largest effect of most existing schemes. Of
course, to the extent that we are being too pessimistic about labour
demand effects, wage subsidies will be even more effective than we
suppose.
This does raise one further issue however: whether expiry of
temporary subsidies will lead to higher separation rates for
subsidised workers. Any well-designed policy will prevent
employers continually replacing subsidy-expired workers with new
subsidised recruits, but it is harder to ensure that they are not
replaced with unsubsidised workers or simply laid off and not
replaced at all1. However, if we assume that there is no effect on
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labour demand, then there is no reason to suppose that the job
would be terminated as a consequence of expiry of the subsidy.
Nor does it seem likely that, after six months in the job, an
employer would prefer to replace a subsidy-expired worker with an
unsubsidised worker. On the contrary, evidence suggests that
subsidised workers are found to be at least as productive as
alternative recruits (Atkinson and Meager, 1994). There is little
evidence on the subsequent employment durations of subsidised
workers. However, Breen and Halpin (1989) found that 54% of
workers hired under the Irish Employment Incentive Scheme were
still with their employers eight months after subsidy expiry, whilst
Arwady (1988), in a study of a single firm, found that US workers
receiving the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit were retained for longer than
unsubsidised workers.
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2. STATE DEPENDENCE
Negative duration dependence of outflow rates is widely found in
industrialised economies (Layard et al, 1991). Two competing
explanations for this exist. State dependence argues that
unemployment itself leads to reduced subsequent outflow rates,
whilst heterogeneity assumes that people differ in their outflow
probabilities, so that low exit rate types are disproportionately
represented among the long-term unemployed. Of course the two are
not mutually exclusive. We do not wish to come down on one side
or the other of this dispute, but will demonstrate instead that policy
is effective whichever is the dominant cause of negative duration
dependence.
We model state dependence as a one-off fall in the relative
outflow rate, after one period of unemployment. Unlike Calmfors
and Lang (1995) who model duration dependence through a zero
outflow state, this allows policy to be targeted on those who have
already suffered duration dependence, whilst avoiding the algebraic
complexity of a continuous process of decline.
Policy is then modelled as a reduction in the extent of state
dependence, equivalent to an increase in the relative outflow rate of
the long-term unemployed.
The model
We assume that wage determination follows the Shapiro-Stiglitz
(1984) shirking model. This ensures that we capture the possible
effect of ALMPs in increasing wage pressure through reducing the
utility loss involved in unemployment (see for example Calmfors and
Forslund, 1991; Calmfors and Lang, 1995). In Section 3 below, we
show that union bargaining over wages leads to identical
conclusions.
There is an exogenous probability of separation, s. After
separation, a worker becomes short-term unemployed. If they fail to
find a job within one period, they become long-term unemployed in
15
the next period, and remain so until they exit. Exit rates from long-
term unemployment are lower than from short-term unemployment
by a factor, 0<b<1, either because the long-term unemployed search
less effectively or because employers discriminate against them.
Following Manning (1993), we allow that workers may exit
from unemployment at the beginning of each period, and hence,
following separation, workers have probability a of being
immediately re-employed. This avoids the problem of unemployment
being bounded below by the normal assumption that at least one
period of unemployment follows separation.
Let w be the real wage, e effort required for workers who work,
and q the probability of detection for a shirker. Unemployed workers
receive per period utility, b, including the value of leisure time as
well as unemployment benefits. Following Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984), we assume linear utility functions.
The standard no shirking condition yields:
V
w e sV
r sE
us
=
- +
+
(1)
( )w rV r s q e qus= + + + (2)
Where VE is the expected present discounted value of utility of
an employed worker, subject to the no-shirking constraint, V us  is the
expected present discounted value of short-term unemployment.
The Bellman equations for short- and long-term unemployment
respectively are:
( )V aV a
r
b Vus E ul= +
-
+
+
1
1
(3)
( )V aV a
r
b Vul E ul= +
-
+
+b
b1
1
(4)
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Where V ul  is the expected present discounted value of long-
term unemployment.
Solving (1), (2), (3) and (4) yields:
( ) ( )w b e e
q
r s
a r
a
= + + + +
+
-
é
ëê
ù
ûú
b
1
(5)
Following Manning (1991) we define unemployment as the
end of period stock. This is both consistent with the way we have
set up the Bellman equations and allows for the fact that a
proportion of those flowing into unemployment in any period also
flow out during that period, and are thus not captured in empirical
stock measurements. Hence, flow equilibrium requires:
( )U a sNST = -1 (6)
( )U a U UST LT ST= +b (7)
leading to:
( )
a
u s u
=
+ -
1
1 1b
(8)
substituting (8) into (5) yields the wage-setting schedule:
( )( )w b e e
q
r s
s u r
u
= + + + +
- +é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
1 b
b
(9)
which can easily be seen to be upward-sloping in wage-employment
space. The model is closed by the labour demand schedule:
w F N= ¢( ) (10)
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where F() is the aggregate production function. However, since
we are assuming that this will be unaffected by policy, we need
consider only equation (9). It is easy to see that policy will be more
effective if it also increases labour demand.
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Policy
We model policy simply as an increase in b. Note that from equation
(8):
( )¶ b
¶b
a
a= 2
so that an increase in relative outflow rate for the long-term
unemployed also implies an increase in their absolute outflow rate.
We can obtain the marginal effect of policy by differentiating
(9) with respect to u and b, holding w constant. However, it will be
easier to identify the offsetting effects by differentiating (5) instead
and substituting for a later, yielding:
( )
( )
du
d
a
u
a a a
rdwb
¶
¶
¶
¶b b=
= -é
ëê
ù
ûú
+
-
+
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
0
1
1
(11)
where:
( )
( )[ ]
( )¶
¶b b b
a u s u
u s u
a a
=
- -
+ -
=
- -
<
1
1 1
1
02 (12)
( )
( )[ ]
¶
¶
b
b
a
u
s u
u s u
=
- -
+ -
<
1
1 1
0
2
2 (13)
From (11), we can see that there are two off-setting effects
represented by the terms in the second bracket:
i) A competition effect, whereby increasing b reduces a since the
short-term unemployed face greater competition for jobs. This
increases the utility cost of unemployment, reducing wage
pressure and lowering unemployment at given wages.
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ii) A utility effect, whereby increasing b reduces the utility costs
of long-term unemployment, pushing wage pressure up and
increasing unemployment at any given wage level.
However, it is immediately obvious from (12) that the
competition effect will dominate for any r>0. Because the utility
gain to the long-term unemployed is discounted more heavily than
the cost to the short-term unemployed from greater competition in
the job market, the threat of unemployment becomes more severe.
Hence a lower wage is needed to prevent shirking, which allows
employment to rise.
Finally, substituting (8), (12) and (13) into (11) yields:
( )
( )
du
d
r u u
rdwb b b=
=
- -
+
<
0
1
0 or 
( )
( )
e
bbu
r u
r
=
- -
+
1
(14)
It follows that programmes targeted at the inflow into
unemployment would have no effect, since as the length of a period
tends to zero, b®1 and r®0, so that the effectiveness of policy will
tend to zero.
It is also worth noting from (14) that 
du
db
< 0  does not require
that b<1 and hence negative duration dependence is not a pre-
requisite for policy effectiveness, although it will increase the
effectiveness of policy, since e bu  is decreasing in b.
Aggregate substitution
We have modelled wage subsidies as an incentive for employers to
substitute long-term unemployed for short-term unemployed
workers when hiring. Similarly, the predominance of the competition
effect in (14) will lead to aggregate substitution as well as a net
reduction of unemployment: short-term unemployment will rise,
though not by as much as long-term unemployment falls.
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We define the aggregate substitution effect under state
dependence as -
du
d
du
d
ST LT
b b
. Noting that the flow equilibrium
condition (7) implies:
u auST = b (15)
we can obtain:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
- =
+ - -
+ + - -
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
du
d
du
d
a
a r r u
a r r u a
ST LT
b b
b
b
b b b
1
1 12
<1 if r>0
(16)
3. UNION BARGAINING
Union bargaining models of wage formation have been popular in
the literature on Active Labour Market Policy (eg Calmfors and
Forslund, 1991; Calmfors and Lang, 1995). Such models share with
the Shapiro-Stiglitz model2 the presumption that unemployment acts
as a discipline on wage setters, and hence counters upward wage
pressure. Hence it is unsurprising that our results, which depend on
the interaction of policy with the appropriately discounted utility of
unemployment, carry over from the efficiency wage case.
Following conventional practice, we assume that the wage is
set so as to maximise the Nash bargain:
w Uit it it=
-arg max c cP1  (17)
where Uit is the utility of the union at time t; Pit, the firm’s operating
profit, and c the relative bargaining strength of the union. Following
Manning (1993), we assume a union utility function of the form:
( )U N V Vit it it tus= -y (18)
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where Nit is the level of firm employment; y the union’s preference
for employment relative to wages; Vit the present discounted value of
employment at the firm and Vt
us  the present discounted value of
short-term unemployment.
We can write the value functions as:
[ ]V r v w s V s Vit it it t
us
it it= +
+ + -+ +
1
1
11 1( ) ( ) (19)
( )[ ]V a V ar v b Vt
us
t
t
t t
ul= +
-
+
+ +
1
1 1
(20)
( )[ ]V a V ar v b Vt
ul
t
t
t t
ul= +
-
+
+ +b
b1
1 1
(21)
( )[ ]V r v w s V s Vt t t t
us
t t= +
+ + -+ +
1
1
11 1( ) (22)
whereV Vt
ul
t,  are the present discounted values of long-term
unemployment and outside employment respectively; v(.) is the
utility function of union members; bt is the real value of
unemployment benefits; sit the probability of separation from the
firm; and w st t,  the wage and separation rate in outside employment.
If we assume that the wage is set for one period only, and that
employment is set unilaterally by the firm, we can write the first
order condition for the maximisation of (17) as:
( )w V Vit it tus= -m where: ( )m ye ecc p= ¢ +
-1 1
v w it
Nw w( )
(23)
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where e e pNw w,  are the elasticities of employment and profits with
respect to the wage. We will assume that m is constant across time
and independent of unemployment, at given wages.
If we solve equations (19) – (23) for a stationary solution, and
impose the equilibrium conditions w w w s s si i= = = =, and , we
obtain:
( )
( ) ( ) [ ]
w
a
r a s a
v w v b=
-
+ + -
-
m
b
1
1
( ) ( ) (24)
Differentiating (24) with respect to u and b, holding the wage
constant, yields:
( )
( )
du
d
a
u
a a a
rdwb
¶
¶
¶
¶b b=
= -é
ëê
ù
ûú
+
-
+
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
0
1
1
(25)
exactly as in the efficiency wage case. Since a is affected only by the
flow equilibrium, and not by wage setting, we can see that the effect
of policy is the same in the union bargaining case as in the efficiency
wage model.
4. HETEROGENEITY
Our model of ALMP can be modified to examine heterogeneity as
well as state dependence. The basic conclusion is the same, that
policy is effective, provided it is targeted at the less able. Since,
given heterogeneity, the less able make up an increasing proportion
of the unemployed as duration increases, this implicitly targets the
long-term unemployed.
Under heterogeneity, however, it is no longer necessary for
policy to target the long-term unemployed directly. In the simplest
case, policy is targeted on the inflow into unemployment. In Section
5 below, we modify this so that policy operates only after one period
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of unemployment, as in the state dependence case. Both models use
Shapiro-Stiglitz wage-setting, but the results from Section 3 above
suggest that equivalent results would be found in the union
bargaining case.
We assume that there are two types of labour, with the least
appointable having an outflow rate g times that of the most able,
where 0<g<1. This enables us to model policy as an increase in g.
However, this does not require that individual’s type is observable:
job search assistance could be offered to all the unemployed, but is
likely to be most valuable to those who have the weakest job search
skills and of little, if any, value to those most job ready. This is less
likely to apply to a wage subsidy, however, and we model this below
as assisting both high and low exit rate workers on the assumption
that it is targeted on the long-term unemployed.
We also assume that ‘appointability’ is drawn randomly on
entry into unemployment and is unemployment-spell-specific. This
ensures that there is a single wage. It also avoids the implication of
worker-specific appointability that those most likely to get hired are
those most likely to shirk on the job.
Targeting the inflow
Suppose unemployed workers are high appointability with
probability p, low appointability with probability 1-p, where ‘high’
workers have exit rate a and ‘low’ workers exit rate ga such that
0<g<1. Equations (1) and (2) continue to define the no shirking
criterion, whilst the remaining value functions are given by:
V V VU U
h
U
l= + -p p( )1 (26)
[ ]V aV ar b VU
h
E U
h= +
-
+
+
1
1
(27)
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[ ]V aV ar b VU
l
E U
l= +
-
+
+g
g1
1
(28)
and hence:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
w b e
e
q
r s a r
a a
= + + + + +
+ -
- + - -
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú1
1
1 1 1
p g p l
p g p l
(29)
where l
g
=
+
+
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
r a
r a
The stock of unemployed at duration i equals the inflow times
the survival rate at duration i. We again define unemployment as the
end of period stock, giving:
u s u ah i= - -
¥
åp ( ) ( )1 1
1
(30)
u s u al i= - - -
¥
å( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1
1
p g (31)
which gives:
( )[ ]a u s u=
+ -
+ -
gp p
g
( )1
1 1
(32)
Policy
Holding w, e, b, r and s constant and differentiating (29) with
respect to g and u yields:
( )
( )
du
d
a
u
a a
dwg
¶
¶
¶
¶g
p
g p p l=
= -é
ëê
ù
ûú
+
-
- +
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
0
21
1
1
(33)
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where:
( )
( )[ ]
( )
( )[ ]
¶
¶g
p
g
p
g gp p
a
u s u
a
=
- -
+ -
=
- -
+ -
<
1
1 1
1
1
02 (34)
( ) ( )[ ]
¶
¶
a
u
a
s u u s u
=
-
- + -
<
1 1 1
02 (35)
Hence, from (33) we can again see that there are competing
competition and utility effects, as in the state dependence model.
From (34) it is clear that if r=0 the effects will exactly cancel out.
Furthermore, 
¶l
¶r
< 0  so that the utility effect is decreasing in r,
whilst the competition effect is independent of r. Hence for any r>0
the competition effect will dominate, and policy will again be
effective.
We also note that as g l g® ®1 1,  and hence the
competition and utility effects will again exactly cancel, regardless of
r. Thus if there is no heterogeneity, policy targeted on the inflow
into unemployment will be ineffective.
Finally substituting (34) and (35) into (33) gives:
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
du
d
r s u
a r adwg
g p p gl
g g p g p l=
=
- - - - +
+ + -
<
0
2
2 2
1 1 1 1
1
0
( )
(36)
Aggregate substitution
Just as in the state dependence case, we can separate out the effects
on high and low exit rate workers to yield an aggregate substitution
effect, where aggregate substitution is now defined as 
-du
d
du
d
h l
g g
where uh, ul are the unemployment rates of high and low exit rate
workers respectively.
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From (30), (31) and (32), we have:
( )( )
u
s u a
a
h =
- -p 1 1
( ) ( )( )
u
s u a
a
l =
- - -1 1 1p g
g
from which we can obtain:
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
-
=
+ + - -
- - + -
du
d
du
d
s du d
s du d
h l
g g
zp g p g g
z p p g g
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
<1 if r>0 and
g<1.
(37)
where: 
( )
( ) ( )[ ]z
gp p
p p
=
+ -
- + -
1
1 1u s u
which gives the aggregate substitution effect.
5. HETEROGENEITY AND POLICY FOR THE LONG-
TERM UNEMPLOYED
So far we have modelled policy under heterogeneity as targeting the
inflow into unemployment, the simplest case. The effectiveness of
policy in this case contrasts with Calmfors’ and Lang’s (1995)
conclusion that ‘targeting the long-term unemployed is crucial for
the success of ALMP’. However, in practice policies are more likely
to be targeted on the long-term unemployed in order to reduce
deadweight. This would be particularly true of relatively expensive
programmes such as wage subsidies, whereas providing job search
assistance to all or part of the inflow might be considered fiscally
viable. Moreover, unless type can be selected on, wage subsidies are
likely to benefit both high and low appointability types, in which
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case the results from section II with r ® 0  would apply and policy
would be ineffective.
We can easily modify the model to account for this. However,
we need slightly different modelling strategies for job search
assistance and wage subsidies. It is reasonable to suppose that job
search assistance programmes will predominantly affect only those
with poor job search strategies and consequently low exit
probabilities. Even if highly appointable workers go on the
programme, they are unlikely to gain much from it, since they are
already pursuing effective job search strategies. In contrast, wage
subsidies are likely to assist both high and low exit rate workers,
although not necessarily equally.
Job search assistance
We suppose that high exit rate workers have exit rate a at all
durations. Low exit rate workers have initial exit rate ga. After one
period of unemployment, however, they are subject to policy and
obtain exit rate b0ga, where b0 is initially unity (in the absence of
state dependence), but is increased by policy.
The wage equation now becomes:
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
w b e
e
q
r s a
r r
a a
= + + + +
+ + - +
- + - -
æ
è
çç
ö
ø
÷÷
é
ë
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
p g p b l
p p g l
1 1
1 1 1
0
~
~
(38)
where: 
~
l
b g
=
+
+
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
r a
r a0
and flow equilibrium gives:
( )
( ) ( )[ ]a u s u=
- +
- + + -
1
1 1
0
0 0
p b gp
g p b p b
(39)
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Solving as before yields:
( )( )
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so that we can again see that the competition effect dominates,
provided r>0 and b0g<1.
Wage subsidies
Suppose instead that policy benefits all the long-term unemployed.
It is unclear theoretically whether the gains would be greater or less
for high exit rate workers than for low exit rate workers. Thus we
define q as the relative effect between high and low exit rate
workers, subject only to the condition that q>g, so that high exit rate
workers always have higher exit rates that low exit rate types. Hence
‘high’ workers have initial exit rate a, and exit rate qb1a after one
period of unemployment, whilst ‘low’ workers have initial exit rate
ga and b1ga thereafter. b1 is now the policy variable.
The wage equation now becomes:
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so that, once again, the competition and utility effects cancel out if
r=0, and the competition effect dominates for any r>0, provided q is
not too large3.
The optimal timing of interventions
From (14), (36), (40) and (44) we can see that, under each of our
sets of assumptions, policy is increasingly effective as r increases.
This suggests that maximum policy effectiveness can be achieved by
targeting the very long-term unemployed. Against this, however, we
need to consider the likely increased difficulty of improving outflow
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rates at longer durations. Furthermore, we can see from (36) and
(40) that both the competition and utility effects will be larger when
policy is targeted on the inflow, where a higher proportion of the
unemployed are subject to it.
In practice, therefore, the optimal timing of interventions will
be determined by the balance between offsetting factors:
i) Both greater discounting and a lower probability of remaining
unemployed long enough to obtain the benefit from
programmes will reduce the wage-increasing utility effect as the
target duration increases. This will tend to make policy more
effective at longer durations, for a given increase in relative
outflow rates.
ii) To the extent that demoralisation and adaptation to a life on
benefits set in (for psychological evidence of adaptation, see
Warr and Jackson, 1987; Winefield and Tiggeman, 1989), the
costs of achieving a given improvement in outflow rates will
rise with duration. In addition, because fewer people will enter
the programme, the increase in competition faced by the short-
term unemployed will be lower.
6. ESTIMATES OF EFFECTIVENESS
Whilst it would be inappropriate to use such a stylised model to
obtain detailed cost-benefit estimates of particular active labour
market policies, equations (14), (36), (40) and (44) can yield
illustrative estimates of what we might expect from active labour
market policy at the aggregate level. Whilst insufficient to establish
whether any given programme is worthwhile, this can at least move
us from the claim that policy can reduce aggregate unemployment to
an assessment of whether such a reduction is likely to be significant.
Table 1 gives some sample calculations of the elasticity of
aggregate unemployment with respect to the relevant policy variable.
The values of g given roughly correspond to those for b, although an
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exact parallel is not possible, since outflow rates decline
continuously with duration in the heterogeneity case, but only once
in the state dependence case. All the calculations are based on an
unemployment rate of 10% and a separation rate of 10%. The
proportion of ‘high’ unemployed workers, p, is set at 0.754. For the
heterogeneity case, with policy targeted on the long-term
unemployed, estimated elasticities are calculated around b0=1 or
b1=1 and q=1 respectively. Varying any of these parameters does not
substantively affect the results.
The subjective rate of time preference, r is set at 0.1. As we
would expect, increasing r leads to much greater effects of policy.
The different elasticities are not directly comparable since the
proportion of the unemployed stock subject to the policy, and the
value of the policy parameter at which the elasticity is calculated,
both vary. Even compensating for this, we would need to know the
costs of policy options before cross-comparisons could be
meaningfully made.
The general message from the values in Table 1, however, is
that active labour market policy could lead to a reduction in
unemployment that is neither negligible nor spectacular. Suppose we
start from an unemployment rate of 10%, and with the outflow rate
of the long-term unemployed half that of the short-term
unemployed. At given wage levels, an Active Labour Market Policy
that eliminated negative duration dependence5 could reduce
aggregate unemployment by around 1.5?2.0 percentage points. From
the measures of aggregate substitution, we can see that the reduction
in long-term unemployment would be approximately double the net
effect so that long-term unemployment would be virtually eliminated
if we assume the long-term unemployed make up about 40% of the
unemployed stock (Nickell, 1987). The final effects would be
smaller, the steeper is the labour demand curve.
7. CONCLUSION
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We have presented a number of closely-related models of active
labour market policy in a macroeconomic framework. These take the
possibility of programme effectiveness at micro-level (for the
participants) for granted, instead asking what the general equilibrium
effects of such policies would be. We also ignore any possible effects
on labour demand, partly because the subject has been thoroughly
dealt with elsewhere (see for example Kaldor, 1936; Bishop and
Haveman, 1979; Layard and Nickell, 1980) and partly because such
effects appear to be quite small (OECD, 1993). Clearly, any outward
shift in the  labour demand schedule would reinforce our results.
Our principal innovation is to model ALMP as a transition
rather than a state. We believe that this is the appropriate framework
for modelling job search assistance and wage subsidy schemes. Our
results suggest that policies that involve directly improving an
unemployed person’s chances of obtaining a regular job, rather than
sending them on a scheme, are unambiguously effective provided
they are targeted on those who are, or are likely to become, long-
term unemployed. Where there is heterogeneity among the
unemployed, this implies that policies targeted on the inflow into
unemployment will be effective, provided that the policies largely
help the less appointable.
The optimal timing of policy involves a trade-off between
larger proportional effects at longer durations and greater difficulties
in improving outflow rates. Unless the unemployed have an
unusually high discount rate, it is probably optimal to target wage
subsidies on those who have been unemployed for at least one year6.
Job search assistance, however, would be disproportionately useful
to those who would otherwise have low exit rates and could
therefore be provided much sooner, particularly if it could be
targeted on those likely to have low exit rates, such as the low
skilled and those with previous experience of unemployment.
Finally, our estimates suggest that a well-designed active
labour market policy could reduce equilibrium unemployment by
perhaps two percentage points, with double the net effect on long-
term unemployment. Although insufficient to return unemployment
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even to the levels of the 1970s, this would certainly be a significant
step in the right direction.
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ENDNOTES
1. The Australian Jobstart programme has a requirement that
participants be kept on after the expiry of their subsidy.
However, Byrne and Buchanan (1994) found that only a small
number of employers were aware of this obligation.
2 . And more generally with the concept of a NAIRU.
3. In general, provided ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]r a rq q q g qb g q g- £ - - + -1 11
this will always hold.
4. For any given p, u and s, the restriction that a£1 implies a limit
on the extent of negative duration dependence. From (32) we
can see that a is decreasing in p as we would expect, and hence
a relatively high value of p is needed to allow for higher values
of duration dependence.
5. Korpi (1994) argues that active labour market policies
eliminate negative duration dependence in Sweden.
6. If young unemployed people have a higher discount rate, it
might be preferable to make wage subsidies available earlier for
them.
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TABLE 1
Estimates of policy effectiveness
State Dependence Heterogeneity
b g eub Substitution eug Substitution eub0 eub1
1.0 1.0 -0.08 69% 0 100% -0.02 -0.08
0.75 0.46 -0.11 63% -0.12 76% -0.13 -0.12
0.6 0.34 -0.13 57% -0.18 68% -0.19 -0.16
0.5 0.27 -0.15 51% -0.23 62% -0.23 -0.20
0.4 0.20 -0.18 44% -0.28 55% -0.28 -0.28
Assuming: r=0.1; s=0.1; u=0.1; p=0.75; b0=b1=q=1
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